Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are:
- Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes
all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs.
We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns
zero on success.
- In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we
simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process.
The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new
mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux
options.
- Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the
security_sctp_assoc_established() hook.
This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should
complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the
associations.
- Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu"
markings of some core kernel structures.
- Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the
stacking-safe accessors.
- Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and
FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is
specified.
- Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements,
additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal.
- Documentation fixes"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits)
selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names
docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst
selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability
selinux: use correct type for context length
selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions
security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
selinux: parse contexts for mount options early
selinux: various sparse fixes
selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid()
selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()
LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param
selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security()
selinux: drop unused macro
selinux: simplify cred_init_security
selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast
selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node
selinux: drop cast to same type
selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis
selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const
...
Now that all of the definitions have moved out of tracehook.h into
ptrace.h, sched/signal.h, resume_user_mode.h there is nothing left in
tracehook.h so remove it.
Update the few files that were depending upon tracehook.h to bring in
definitions to use the headers they need directly.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220309162454.123006-13-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The offloaded HW stats are designed to allow per-netdevice enablement and
disablement. These stats are only accessible through RTM_GETSTATS, and
therefore should be toggled by a RTM_SETSTATS message. Add it, and the
necessary skeleton handler.
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The SELinux policy capability enum names are rather long and follow
the "POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_XXX format". While the "POLICYDB_" prefix
is helpful in tying the enums to other SELinux policy constants,
macros, etc. there is no reason why we need to spell out
"CAPABILITY" completely. Shorten "CAPABILITY" to "CAP" in order to
make things a bit shorter and cleaner.
Moving forward, the SELinux policy capability enum names should
follow the "POLICYDB_CAP_XXX" format.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds new rtm tunnel msg and api for tunnel id
filtering in dst_metadata devices. First dst_metadata
device to use the api is vxlan driver with AF_BRIDGE
family.
This and later changes add ability in vxlan driver to do
tunnel id filtering (or vni filtering) on dst_metadata
devices. This is similar to vlan api in the vlan filtering bridge.
this patch includes selinux nlmsg_route_perms support for RTM_*TUNNEL
api from Benjamin Poirier.
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux
always allows too. Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file
descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it.
As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be
enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls.
Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
mutex_is_locked() tests whether the mutex is locked *by any task*, while
here we want to test if it is held *by the current task*. To avoid
false/missed WARNINGs, use lockdep_assert_is_held() and
lockdep_assert_is_not_held() instead, which do the right thing (though
they are a no-op if CONFIG_LOCKDEP=n).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2554a48f44 ("selinux: measure state and policy capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security_sid_to_context() expects a pointer to an u32 as the address
where to store the length of the computed context.
Reported by sparse:
security/selinux/xfrm.c:359:39: warning: incorrect type in arg 4
(different signedness)
security/selinux/xfrm.c:359:39: expected unsigned int
[usertype] *scontext_len
security/selinux/xfrm.c:359:39: got int *
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: wrapped commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Those return statements at the end of a void function are redundant.
Reported by clang-tidy [readability-redundant-control-flow]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Do this by extracting the peer labeling per-association logic from
selinux_sctp_assoc_request() into a new helper
selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc() and use this helper in both
selinux_sctp_assoc_request() and selinux_sctp_assoc_established(). This
ensures that the peer labeling behavior as documented in
Documentation/security/SCTP.rst is applied both on the client and server
side:
"""
An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
assigned during the establishment of the first association. Any further
associations on this socket will have their packet peer label compared to
the sockets peer label, and only if they are different will the
``association`` permission be validated. This is validated by checking the
socket peer sid against the received packets peer sid to determine whether
the association should be allowed or denied.
"""
At the same time, it also ensures that the peer label of the association
is set to the correct value, such that if it is peeled off into a new
socket, the socket's peer label will then be set to the association's
peer label, same as it already works on the server side.
While selinux_inet_conn_established() (which we are replacing by
selinux_sctp_assoc_established() for SCTP) only deals with assigning a
peer label to the connection (socket), in case of SCTP we need to also
copy the (local) socket label to the association, so that
selinux_sctp_sk_clone() can then pick it up for the new socket in case
of SCTP peeloff.
Careful readers will notice that the selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc()
helper also includes the "IPv4 packet received over an IPv6 socket"
check, even though it hadn't been in selinux_sctp_assoc_request()
before. While such check is not necessary in
selinux_inet_conn_request() (because struct request_sock's family field
is already set according to the skb's family), here it is needed, as we
don't have request_sock and we take the initial family from the socket.
In selinux_sctp_assoc_established() it is similarly needed as well (and
also selinux_inet_conn_established() already has it).
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit b8b87fd954 ("selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()")
started to parse mount options into SIDs in selinux_add_opt() if policy
has already been loaded. Since it's extremely unlikely that anyone would
depend on the ability to set SELinux contexts on fs_context before
loading the policy and then mounting that context after simplify the
logic by always parsing the options early.
Note that the multi-step mounting is only possible with the new
fscontext mount API and wasn't possible before its introduction.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On error path from cond_read_list() and duplicate_policydb_cond_list()
the cond_list_destroy() gets called a second time in caller functions,
resulting in NULL pointer deref. Fix this by resetting the
cond_list_len to 0 in cond_list_destroy(), making subsequent calls a
noop.
Also consistently reset the cond_list pointer to NULL after freeing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vratislav Bendel <vbendel@redhat.com>
[PM: fix line lengths in the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When running the SELinux code through sparse, there are a handful of
warnings. This patch resolves some of these warnings caused by
"__rcu" mismatches.
% make W=1 C=1 security/selinux/
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Avoid unnecessary parsing of sids that have already been parsed via
selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts().
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() is called under the sb_lock spinlock and
shouldn't be performing any memory allocations. Fix this by parsing the
sids at the same time we're chopping up the security mount options
string and then using the pre-parsed sids when doing the comparison.
Fixes: cc274ae776 ("selinux: fix sleeping function called from invalid context")
Fixes: 69c4a42d72 ("lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The usual LSM hook "bail on fail" scheme doesn't work for cases where
a security module may return an error code indicating that it does not
recognize an input. In this particular case Smack sees a mount option
that it recognizes, and returns 0. A call to a BPF hook follows, which
returns -ENOPARAM, which confuses the caller because Smack has processed
its data.
The SELinux hook incorrectly returns 1 on success. There was a time
when this was correct, however the current expectation is that it
return 0 on success. This is repaired.
Reported-by: syzbot+d1e3b1d92d25abf97943@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In the process of removing an explicit type cast to preserve a cred
const qualifier in cred_init_security() we ran into a problem where
the task_struct::real_cred field is defined with the "__rcu"
attribute but the selinux_cred() function parameter is not, leading
to a sparse warning:
security/selinux/hooks.c:216:36: sparse: sparse:
incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@@ expected struct cred const *cred
@@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred
As we don't want to add the "__rcu" attribute to the selinux_cred()
parameter, we're going to add an explicit cast back to
cred_init_security().
Fixes: b084e189b0 ("selinux: simplify cred_init_security")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The macro _DEBUG_HASHES is nowhere used. The configuration DEBUG_HASHES
enables debugging of the SELinux hash tables, but the with an underscore
prefixed macro definition has no direct impact or any documentation.
Reported by clang [-Wunused-macros]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The parameter of selinux_cred() is declared const, so an explicit cast
dropping the const qualifier is not necessary. Without the cast the
local variable cred serves no purpose.
Reported by clang [-Wcast-qual]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Do not discard the const qualifier on the cast from const void* to
__be32*; the addressed value is not modified.
Reported by clang [-Wcast-qual]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The parameter cur is not used in avtab_insert_node().
Reported by clang [-Wunused-parameter]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Both the lvalue scontextp and rvalue scontext are of the type char*.
Drop the redundant explicit cast not needed since commit 9a59daa03d
("SELinux: fix sleeping allocation in security_context_to_sid"), where
the type of scontext changed from const char* to char*.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Enclose the macro arguments in parenthesis to avoid potential evaluation
order issues.
Note the xperm and ebitmap macros are still not side-effect safe due to
double evaluation.
Reported by clang-tidy [bugprone-macro-parentheses]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
String literals are passed as second argument to hash_eval(). Also the
parameter is already declared const in the DEBUG_HASHES configuration.
Reported by clang [-Wwrite-strings]:
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1881:26: error: passing
'const char [8]' to parameter of type 'char *' discards
qualifiers
hash_eval(&p->range_tr, rangetr);
^~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:707:55: note: passing argument to
parameter 'hash_name' here
static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name)
^
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2099:32: error: passing
'const char [11]' to parameter of type 'char *' discards
qualifiers
hash_eval(&p->filename_trans, filenametr);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:707:55: note: passing argument to
parameter 'hash_name' here
static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name)
^
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: line wrapping in description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The path parameter is only read from in security_genfs_sid(),
selinux_policy_genfs_sid() and __security_genfs_sid(). Since a string
literal is passed as argument, declare the parameter const.
Also align the parameter names in the declaration and definition.
Reported by clang [-Wwrite-strings]:
security/selinux/hooks.c:553:60: error: passing 'const char [2]'
to parameter of type 'char *' discards qualifiers
[-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers]
rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, ... , /,
^~~
./security/selinux/include/security.h:389:36: note: passing
argument to parameter 'name' here
const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
^
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: wrapped description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
sel_make_avc_files() might fail and return a negative errno value on
memory allocation failures. Re-add the check of the return value,
dropped in 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table").
Reported by clang-analyzer:
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c:2129:2: warning: Value stored to
'ret' is never read [deadcode.DeadStores]
ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fixes: 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
[PM: description line wrapping, added proper commit ref]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
LSM blob has been involved for superblock's security struct. So fix the
remaining direct access to sb->s_security by using the LSM blob
mechanism.
Fixes: 08abe46b2c ("selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support")
Fixes: 69c4a42d72 ("lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount")
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nothing too significant, but five SELinux patches for v5.17 that do
the following:
- Harden the code through additional use of the struct_size() macro
- Plug some memory leaks
- Clean up the code via removal of the security_add_mnt_opt() LSM
hook and minor tweaks to selinux_add_opt()
- Rename security_task_getsecid_subj() to better reflect its actual
behavior/use - now called security_current_getsecid_subj()"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220110' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: minor tweaks to selinux_add_opt()
selinux: fix potential memleak in selinux_add_opt()
security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()
selinux: Use struct_size() helper in kmalloc()
lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()
Clang static analysis reports this warning
hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized
value
if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto. The later call
to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can
return ok if the garbage proto value matches. So initialize proto.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eef9b41622 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
[PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Two minor edits to selinux_add_opt(): use "sizeof(*ptr)" instead of
"sizeof(type)" in the kzalloc() call, and rename the "Einval" jump
target to "err" for the sake of consistency.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch try to fix potential memleak in error branch.
Fixes: ba64186233 ("selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()")
Signed-off-by: Bernard Zhao <bernard@vivo.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, add Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct
argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also
rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When the hash table slot array allocation fails in hashtab_init(),
h->size is left initialized with a non-zero value, but the h->htable
pointer is NULL. This may then cause a NULL pointer dereference, since
the policydb code relies on the assumption that even after a failed
hashtab_init(), hashtab_map() and hashtab_destroy() can be safely called
on it. Yet, these detect an empty hashtab only by looking at the size.
Fix this by making sure that hashtab_init() always leaves behind a valid
empty hashtab when the allocation fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03414a49ad ("selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c9402
("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and
7c2ef0240e ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which
create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a
SELinux implementation. Unfortunately these two patches were merged
without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from
Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that
were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections
from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches.
Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the
reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review,
but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready
for inclusion in the mainline kernel. In the interest of not keeping
objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially
a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the
secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(),
as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs.
Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this
asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer
secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do
peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in
one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for
its asoc.
v1->v2:
- call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code
duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej
suggested.
- when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually
gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse
SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that
secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.
Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().
v1->v2:
- fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
- fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.
Fixes: 72e89f5008 ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring.
As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we
were basically missing two things which we're adding here:
+ establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of
io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with
some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls)
+ additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of
the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides.
The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction
with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches
earlier in the year.
- Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials
are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code
comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand
the background and why this is the proper fix.
- Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing
improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make
use of securityfs, e.g. IMA.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()
selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
binder: use euid from cred instead of using task
LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables
selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings
selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks
selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs
selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers
selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs
Smack: Brutalist io_uring support
selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface
fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure()
audit: add filtering for io_uring records
audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security
label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook,
namely ceph and nfs.
NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to
security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX).
I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd
and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of
xattr to security.selinux.
Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify
security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that
we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers.
This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to
security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr
too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL).
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed typos in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Unfortunately we can't rely on nf_hook_state->sk being the proper
originating socket so revert to using skb_to_full_sk(skb).
Fixes: 1d1e1ded13 ("selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks")
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.
Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes: 79af73079d ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.")
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There were a number of places in the code where the function
definition did not match the associated comment block as well
at least one file where the appropriate header files were not
included (missing function declaration/prototype); this patch
fixes all of these issue such that building the SELinux code
with "W=1" is now warning free.
% make W=1 security/selinux/
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch builds on a previous SELinux/netfilter patch by Florian
Westphal and makes better use of the nf_hook_state variable passed
into the SELinux/netfilter hooks as well as a number of other small
cleanups in the related code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Current code contains a lot of racy patterns when converting an
ocontext's context structure to an SID. This is being done in a "lazy"
fashion, such that the SID is looked up in the SID table only when it's
first needed and then cached in the "sid" field of the ocontext
structure. However, this is done without any locking or memory barriers
and is thus unsafe.
Between commits 24ed7fdae6 ("selinux: use separate table for initial
SID lookup") and 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash
table"), this race condition lead to an actual observable bug, because a
pointer to the shared sid field was passed directly to
sidtab_context_to_sid(), which was using this location to also store an
intermediate value, which could have been read by other threads and
interpreted as an SID. In practice this caused e.g. new mounts to get a
wrong (seemingly random) filesystem context, leading to strange denials.
This bug has been spotted in the wild at least twice, see [1] and [2].
Fix the race condition by making all the racy functions use a common
helper that ensures the ocontext::sid accesses are made safely using the
appropriate SMP constructs.
Note that security_netif_sid() was populating the sid field of both
contexts stored in the ocontext, but only the first one was actually
used. The SELinux wiki's documentation on the "netifcon" policy
statement [3] suggests that using only the first context is intentional.
I kept only the handling of the first context here, as there is really
no point in doing the SID lookup for the unused one.
I wasn't able to reproduce the bug mentioned above on any kernel that
includes commit 66f8e2f03c, even though it has been reported that the
issue occurs with that commit, too, just less frequently. Thus, I wasn't
able to verify that this patch fixes the issue, but it makes sense to
avoid the race condition regardless.
[1] https://github.com/containers/container-selinux/issues/89
[2] https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/selinux@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/6DMTAMHIOAOEMUAVTULJD45JZU7IBAFM/
[3] https://selinuxproject.org/page/NetworkStatements#netifcon
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Xinjie Zheng <xinjie@google.com>
Reported-by: Sujithra Periasamy <sujithra@google.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Netfilter places the protocol number the hook function is getting called
from in state->pf, so we can use that instead of an extra wrapper.
While at it, remove one-line wrappers too and make
selinux_ip_{out,forward,postroute} useable as hook function.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Message-Id: <20211011202229.28289-1-fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2021-10-07
1) Fix a sysbot reported shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_get_default.
From Pavel Skripkin.
2) Fix XFRM_MSG_MAPPING ABI breakage. The new XFRM_MSG_MAPPING
messages were accidentally not paced at the end.
Fix by Eugene Syromiatnikov.
3) Fix the uapi for the default policy, use explicit field and macros
and make it accessible to userland.
From Nicolas Dichtel.
4) Fix a missing rcu lock in xfrm_notify_userpolicy().
From Nicolas Dichtel.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
NOTE: This patch intentionally omits any "Fixes:" metadata or stable
tagging since it removes a SELinux access control check; while
removing the control point is the right thing to do moving forward,
removing it in stable kernels could be seen as a regression.
The original SELinux lockdown implementation in 59438b4647
("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown") used the
current task's credentials as both the subject and object in the
SELinux lockdown hook, selinux_lockdown(). Unfortunately that
proved to be incorrect in a number of cases as the core kernel was
calling the LSM lockdown hook in places where the credentials from
the "current" task_struct were not the correct credentials to use
in the SELinux access check.
Attempts were made to resolve this by adding a credential pointer
to the LSM lockdown hook as well as suggesting that the single hook
be split into two: one for user tasks, one for kernel tasks; however
neither approach was deemed acceptable by Linus. Faced with the
prospect of either changing the subj/obj in the access check to a
constant context (likely the kernel's label) or removing the SELinux
lockdown check entirely, the SELinux community decided that removing
the lockdown check was preferable.
The supporting changes to the general LSM layer are left intact, this
patch only removes the SELinux implementation.
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of securityfs files.
This allows for separate labels and thereby access control for
different files. For example a genfscon statement
genfscon securityfs /integrity/ima/policy \
system_u:object_r:ima_policy_t:s0
will set a private label to the IMA policy file and thus allow to
control the ability to set the IMA policy. Setting labels directly
with setxattr(2), e.g. by chcon(1) or setfiles(8), is still not
supported.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: line width fixes in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
