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* kvm-arm64/pkvm-protected-guest: (41 commits) : . : pKVM support for protected guests, implementing the very long : awaited support for anonymous memory, as the elusive guestmem : has failed to deliver on its promises despite a multi-year : effort. Patches courtesy of Will Deacon. From the initial cover : letter: : : "[...] this patch series implements support for protected guest : memory with pKVM, where pages are unmapped from the host as they are : faulted into the guest and can be shared back from the guest using pKVM : hypercalls. Protected guests are created using a new machine type : identifier and can be booted to a shell using the kvmtool patches : available at [2], which finally means that we are able to test the pVM : logic in pKVM. Since this is an incremental step towards full isolation : from the host (for example, the CPU register state and DMA accesses are : not yet isolated), creating a pVM requires a developer Kconfig option to : be enabled in addition to booting with 'kvm-arm.mode=protected' and : results in a kernel taint." : . KVM: arm64: Don't hold 'vm_table_lock' across guest page reclaim KVM: arm64: Allow get_pkvm_hyp_vm() to take a reference to a dying VM KVM: arm64: Prevent teardown finalisation of referenced 'hyp_vm' drivers/virt: pkvm: Add Kconfig dependency on DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL KVM: arm64: Rename PKVM_PAGE_STATE_MASK KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest hvcs KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover forced reclaim KVM: arm64: Register 'selftest_vm' in the VM table KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest donation KVM: arm64: Add some initial documentation for pKVM KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to create protected VMs when pKVM is enabled KVM: arm64: Implement the MEM_UNSHARE hypercall for protected VMs KVM: arm64: Implement the MEM_SHARE hypercall for protected VMs KVM: arm64: Add hvc handler at EL2 for hypercalls from protected VMs KVM: arm64: Return -EFAULT from VCPU_RUN on access to a poisoned pte KVM: arm64: Reclaim faulting page from pKVM in spurious fault handler KVM: arm64: Introduce hypercall to force reclaim of a protected page KVM: arm64: Annotate guest donations with handle and gfn in host stage-2 KVM: arm64: Change 'pkvm_handle_t' to u16 KVM: arm64: Introduce host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked() ... Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
410 lines
11 KiB
C
410 lines
11 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2015 - ARM Ltd
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* Author: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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*/
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#include <hyp/switch.h>
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#include <hyp/sysreg-sr.h>
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#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/jump_label.h>
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#include <uapi/linux/psci.h>
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#include <kvm/arm_psci.h>
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#include <asm/barrier.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#include <asm/kprobes.h>
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#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
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#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
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#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
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#include <asm/kvm_hypevents.h>
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#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
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#include <asm/fpsimd.h>
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#include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <nvhe/mem_protect.h>
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/* Non-VHE specific context */
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DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_host_data, kvm_host_data);
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DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_cpu_context, kvm_hyp_ctxt);
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DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_hyp_vector);
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struct fgt_masks hfgrtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hfgwtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hfgitr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hdfgrtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hdfgwtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hafgrtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hfgrtr2_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hfgwtr2_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hfgitr2_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hdfgrtr2_masks;
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struct fgt_masks hdfgwtr2_masks;
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struct fgt_masks ich_hfgrtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks ich_hfgwtr_masks;
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struct fgt_masks ich_hfgitr_masks;
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extern void kvm_nvhe_prepare_backtrace(unsigned long fp, unsigned long pc);
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static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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___activate_traps(vcpu, vcpu->arch.hcr_el2);
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*host_data_ptr(host_debug_state.mdcr_el2) = read_sysreg(mdcr_el2);
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write_sysreg(vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2, mdcr_el2);
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__activate_traps_common(vcpu);
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__activate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
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write_sysreg(__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_vector), vbar_el2);
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if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)) {
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struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.ctxt;
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isb();
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/*
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* At this stage, and thanks to the above isb(), S2 is
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* configured and enabled. We can now restore the guest's S1
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* configuration: SCTLR, and only then TCR.
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*/
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write_sysreg_el1(ctxt_sys_reg(ctxt, SCTLR_EL1), SYS_SCTLR);
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isb();
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write_sysreg_el1(ctxt_sys_reg(ctxt, TCR_EL1), SYS_TCR);
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}
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}
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static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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extern char __kvm_hyp_host_vector[];
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___deactivate_traps(vcpu);
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if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)) {
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u64 val;
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/*
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* Set the TCR and SCTLR registers in the exact opposite
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* sequence as __activate_traps (first prevent walks,
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* then force the MMU on). A generous sprinkling of isb()
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* ensure that things happen in this exact order.
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*/
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val = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_TCR);
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write_sysreg_el1(val | TCR_EPD1_MASK | TCR_EPD0_MASK, SYS_TCR);
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isb();
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val = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_SCTLR);
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write_sysreg_el1(val | SCTLR_ELx_M, SYS_SCTLR);
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isb();
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}
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write_sysreg(*host_data_ptr(host_debug_state.mdcr_el2), mdcr_el2);
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__deactivate_traps_common(vcpu);
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write_sysreg_hcr(this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params)->hcr_el2);
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__deactivate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
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write_sysreg(__kvm_hyp_host_vector, vbar_el2);
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}
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/* Save VGICv3 state on non-VHE systems */
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static void __hyp_vgic_save_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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if (vgic_is_v5(kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm))) {
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__vgic_v5_save_state(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v5);
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__vgic_v5_save_ppi_state(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v5);
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return;
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}
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if (static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_vgic_global_state.gicv3_cpuif)) {
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__vgic_v3_save_state(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
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__vgic_v3_deactivate_traps(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
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}
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}
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/* Restore VGICv3 state on non-VHE systems */
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static void __hyp_vgic_restore_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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if (vgic_is_v5(kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm))) {
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__vgic_v5_restore_state(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v5);
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__vgic_v5_restore_ppi_state(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v5);
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return;
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}
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if (static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_vgic_global_state.gicv3_cpuif)) {
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__vgic_v3_activate_traps(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
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__vgic_v3_restore_state(&vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Disable host events, enable guest events
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_HW_PERF_EVENTS
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static bool __pmu_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct kvm_pmu_events *pmu = &vcpu->arch.pmu.events;
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if (pmu->events_host)
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write_sysreg(pmu->events_host, pmcntenclr_el0);
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if (pmu->events_guest)
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write_sysreg(pmu->events_guest, pmcntenset_el0);
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return (pmu->events_host || pmu->events_guest);
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}
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/*
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* Disable guest events, enable host events
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*/
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static void __pmu_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct kvm_pmu_events *pmu = &vcpu->arch.pmu.events;
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if (pmu->events_guest)
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write_sysreg(pmu->events_guest, pmcntenclr_el0);
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if (pmu->events_host)
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write_sysreg(pmu->events_host, pmcntenset_el0);
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}
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#else
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#define __pmu_switch_to_guest(v) ({ false; })
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#define __pmu_switch_to_host(v) do {} while (0)
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#endif
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/*
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* Handler for protected VM MSR, MRS or System instruction execution in AArch64.
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*
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* Returns true if the hypervisor has handled the exit, and control should go
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* back to the guest, or false if it hasn't.
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*/
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static bool kvm_handle_pvm_sys64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
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{
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/*
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* Make sure we handle the exit for workarounds before the pKVM
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* handling, as the latter could decide to UNDEF.
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*/
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return (kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(vcpu, exit_code) ||
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kvm_handle_pvm_sysreg(vcpu, exit_code));
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}
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static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {
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[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = NULL,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_MOPS] = kvm_hyp_handle_mops,
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};
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static const exit_handler_fn pvm_exit_handlers[] = {
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[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = NULL,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_HVC64] = kvm_handle_pvm_hvc64,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = kvm_handle_pvm_sys64,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = kvm_handle_pvm_restricted,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low,
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[ESR_ELx_EC_MOPS] = kvm_hyp_handle_mops,
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};
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static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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if (unlikely(vcpu_is_protected(vcpu)))
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return pvm_exit_handlers;
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return hyp_exit_handlers;
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}
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static inline bool fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
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{
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const exit_handler_fn *handlers = kvm_get_exit_handler_array(vcpu);
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synchronize_vcpu_pstate(vcpu);
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/*
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* Some guests (e.g., protected VMs) are not be allowed to run in
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* AArch32. The ARMv8 architecture does not give the hypervisor a
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* mechanism to prevent a guest from dropping to AArch32 EL0 if
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* implemented by the CPU. If the hypervisor spots a guest in such a
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* state ensure it is handled, and don't trust the host to spot or fix
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* it. The check below is based on the one in
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* kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run().
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*/
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if (unlikely(vcpu_is_protected(vcpu) && vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu))) {
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/*
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* As we have caught the guest red-handed, decide that it isn't
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* fit for purpose anymore by making the vcpu invalid. The VMM
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* can try and fix it by re-initializing the vcpu with
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* KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT, however, this is likely not possible for
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* protected VMs.
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*/
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vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, VCPU_INITIALIZED);
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*exit_code &= BIT(ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT);
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*exit_code |= ARM_EXCEPTION_IL;
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}
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return __fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, exit_code, handlers);
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}
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/* Switch to the guest for legacy non-VHE systems */
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int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt;
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struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt;
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struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu;
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bool pmu_switch_needed;
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u64 exit_code;
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/*
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* Having IRQs masked via PMR when entering the guest means the GIC
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* will not signal the CPU of interrupts of lower priority, and the
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* only way to get out will be via guest exceptions.
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* Naturally, we want to avoid this.
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*/
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if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking()) {
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gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQON | GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET);
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pmr_sync();
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}
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host_ctxt = host_data_ptr(host_ctxt);
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host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu = vcpu;
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guest_ctxt = &vcpu->arch.ctxt;
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pmu_switch_needed = __pmu_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
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__sysreg_save_state_nvhe(host_ctxt);
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/*
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* We must flush and disable the SPE buffer for nVHE, as
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* the translation regime(EL1&0) is going to be loaded with
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* that of the guest. And we must do this before we change the
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* translation regime to EL2 (via MDCR_EL2_E2PB == 0) and
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* before we load guest Stage1.
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*/
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__debug_save_host_buffers_nvhe(vcpu);
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/*
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* We're about to restore some new MMU state. Make sure
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* ongoing page-table walks that have started before we
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* trapped to EL2 have completed. This also synchronises the
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* above disabling of BRBE.
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*
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* See DDI0487I.a D8.1.5 "Out-of-context translation regimes",
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* rule R_LFHQG and subsequent information statements.
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*/
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dsb(nsh);
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__kvm_adjust_pc(vcpu);
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/*
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* We must restore the 32-bit state before the sysregs, thanks
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* to erratum #852523 (Cortex-A57) or #853709 (Cortex-A72).
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*
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* Also, and in order to be able to deal with erratum #1319537 (A57)
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* and #1319367 (A72), we must ensure that all VM-related sysreg are
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* restored before we enable S2 translation.
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*/
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__sysreg32_restore_state(vcpu);
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__sysreg_restore_state_nvhe(guest_ctxt);
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mmu = kern_hyp_va(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
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__load_stage2(mmu, kern_hyp_va(mmu->arch));
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__activate_traps(vcpu);
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__hyp_vgic_restore_state(vcpu);
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__timer_enable_traps(vcpu);
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__debug_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
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do {
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trace_hyp_exit(host_ctxt, HYP_REASON_ERET_GUEST);
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/* Jump in the fire! */
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exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu);
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/* And we're baaack! */
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trace_hyp_enter(host_ctxt, HYP_REASON_GUEST_EXIT);
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} while (fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, &exit_code));
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__sysreg_save_state_nvhe(guest_ctxt);
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__sysreg32_save_state(vcpu);
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__timer_disable_traps(vcpu);
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__hyp_vgic_save_state(vcpu);
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/*
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* Same thing as before the guest run: we're about to switch
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* the MMU context, so let's make sure we don't have any
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* ongoing EL1&0 translations.
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*/
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dsb(nsh);
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__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
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__load_host_stage2();
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__sysreg_restore_state_nvhe(host_ctxt);
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if (guest_owns_fp_regs())
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__fpsimd_save_fpexc32(vcpu);
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__debug_switch_to_host(vcpu);
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/*
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* This must come after restoring the host sysregs, since a non-VHE
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* system may enable SPE here and make use of the TTBRs.
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*/
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__debug_restore_host_buffers_nvhe(vcpu);
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if (pmu_switch_needed)
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__pmu_switch_to_host(vcpu);
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/* Returning to host will clear PSR.I, remask PMR if needed */
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if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
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gic_write_pmr(GIC_PRIO_IRQOFF);
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host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu = NULL;
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return exit_code;
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}
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asmlinkage void __noreturn hyp_panic(void)
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{
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u64 spsr = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_SPSR);
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u64 elr = read_sysreg_el2(SYS_ELR);
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u64 par = read_sysreg_par();
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struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt;
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struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
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host_ctxt = host_data_ptr(host_ctxt);
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vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu;
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if (vcpu) {
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__timer_disable_traps(vcpu);
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__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
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__load_host_stage2();
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__sysreg_restore_state_nvhe(host_ctxt);
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}
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/* Prepare to dump kvm nvhe hyp stacktrace */
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kvm_nvhe_prepare_backtrace((unsigned long)__builtin_frame_address(0),
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_THIS_IP_);
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__hyp_do_panic(host_ctxt, spsr, elr, par);
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unreachable();
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}
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asmlinkage void __noreturn hyp_panic_bad_stack(void)
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{
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hyp_panic();
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}
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asmlinkage void kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void)
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{
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__kvm_unexpected_el2_exception();
|
|
}
|