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Since nvme_auth_digest_name() is no longer used, remove it and the associated data from the hash_map array. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
729 lines
19 KiB
C
729 lines
19 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2020 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Linux
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/crc32.h>
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#include <linux/base64.h>
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#include <linux/prandom.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <linux/unaligned.h>
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#include <crypto/dh.h>
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#include <crypto/sha2.h>
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#include <linux/nvme.h>
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#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
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static u32 nvme_dhchap_seqnum;
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(nvme_dhchap_mutex);
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u32 nvme_auth_get_seqnum(void)
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{
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u32 seqnum;
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mutex_lock(&nvme_dhchap_mutex);
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if (!nvme_dhchap_seqnum)
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nvme_dhchap_seqnum = get_random_u32();
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else {
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nvme_dhchap_seqnum++;
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if (!nvme_dhchap_seqnum)
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nvme_dhchap_seqnum++;
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}
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seqnum = nvme_dhchap_seqnum;
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mutex_unlock(&nvme_dhchap_mutex);
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return seqnum;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_get_seqnum);
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static const struct nvme_auth_dhgroup_map {
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char name[16];
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char kpp[16];
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} dhgroup_map[] = {
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[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_NULL] = {
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.name = "null", .kpp = "null" },
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[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_2048] = {
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.name = "ffdhe2048", .kpp = "ffdhe2048(dh)" },
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[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_3072] = {
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.name = "ffdhe3072", .kpp = "ffdhe3072(dh)" },
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[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_4096] = {
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.name = "ffdhe4096", .kpp = "ffdhe4096(dh)" },
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[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_6144] = {
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.name = "ffdhe6144", .kpp = "ffdhe6144(dh)" },
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[NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_8192] = {
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.name = "ffdhe8192", .kpp = "ffdhe8192(dh)" },
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};
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const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(u8 dhgroup_id)
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{
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if (dhgroup_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map))
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return NULL;
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return dhgroup_map[dhgroup_id].name;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_name);
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const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(u8 dhgroup_id)
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{
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if (dhgroup_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map))
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return NULL;
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return dhgroup_map[dhgroup_id].kpp;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp);
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u8 nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name)
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{
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int i;
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if (!dhgroup_name || !strlen(dhgroup_name))
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return NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_INVALID;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
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if (!strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name))
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continue;
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if (!strncmp(dhgroup_map[i].name, dhgroup_name,
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strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name)))
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return i;
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}
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return NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_INVALID;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_id);
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static const struct nvme_dhchap_hash_map {
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int len;
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char hmac[15];
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} hash_map[] = {
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[NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256] = {
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.len = 32,
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.hmac = "hmac(sha256)",
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},
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[NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384] = {
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.len = 48,
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.hmac = "hmac(sha384)",
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},
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[NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512] = {
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.len = 64,
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.hmac = "hmac(sha512)",
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},
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};
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const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(u8 hmac_id)
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{
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if (hmac_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map))
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return NULL;
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return hash_map[hmac_id].hmac;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_name);
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u8 nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name)
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{
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int i;
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if (!hmac_name || !strlen(hmac_name))
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return NVME_AUTH_HASH_INVALID;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
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if (!strlen(hash_map[i].hmac))
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continue;
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if (!strncmp(hash_map[i].hmac, hmac_name,
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strlen(hash_map[i].hmac)))
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return i;
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}
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return NVME_AUTH_HASH_INVALID;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_id);
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size_t nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(u8 hmac_id)
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{
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if (hmac_id >= ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map))
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return 0;
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return hash_map[hmac_id].len;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len);
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u32 nvme_auth_key_struct_size(u32 key_len)
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{
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struct nvme_dhchap_key key;
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return struct_size(&key, key, key_len);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_key_struct_size);
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_extract_key(const char *secret, u8 key_hash)
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{
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *key;
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const char *p;
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u32 crc;
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int ret, key_len;
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size_t allocated_len = strlen(secret);
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/* Secret might be affixed with a ':' */
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p = strrchr(secret, ':');
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if (p)
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allocated_len = p - secret;
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key = nvme_auth_alloc_key(allocated_len, 0);
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if (!key)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key->key, true, BASE64_STD);
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if (key_len < 0) {
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pr_debug("base64 key decoding error %d\n",
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key_len);
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ret = key_len;
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goto out_free_key;
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}
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if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 &&
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key_len != 68) {
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pr_err("Invalid key len %d\n", key_len);
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ret = -EINVAL;
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goto out_free_key;
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}
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/* The last four bytes is the CRC in little-endian format */
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key_len -= 4;
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/*
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* The linux implementation doesn't do pre- and post-increments,
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* so we have to do it manually.
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*/
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crc = ~crc32(~0, key->key, key_len);
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if (get_unaligned_le32(key->key + key_len) != crc) {
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pr_err("key crc mismatch (key %08x, crc %08x)\n",
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get_unaligned_le32(key->key + key_len), crc);
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto out_free_key;
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}
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key->len = key_len;
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key->hash = key_hash;
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return key;
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out_free_key:
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nvme_auth_free_key(key);
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return ERR_PTR(ret);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_extract_key);
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_alloc_key(u32 len, u8 hash)
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{
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u32 num_bytes = nvme_auth_key_struct_size(len);
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *key = kzalloc(num_bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (key) {
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key->len = len;
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key->hash = hash;
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}
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return key;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_alloc_key);
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void nvme_auth_free_key(struct nvme_dhchap_key *key)
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{
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if (!key)
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return;
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kfree_sensitive(key);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free_key);
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/*
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* Start computing an HMAC value, given the algorithm ID and raw key.
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*
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* The context should be zeroized at the end of its lifetime. The caller can do
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* that implicitly by calling nvme_auth_hmac_final(), or explicitly (needed when
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* a context is abandoned without finalizing it) by calling memzero_explicit().
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*/
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int nvme_auth_hmac_init(struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx *hmac, u8 hmac_id,
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const u8 *key, size_t key_len)
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{
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hmac->hmac_id = hmac_id;
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switch (hmac_id) {
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
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hmac_sha256_init_usingrawkey(&hmac->sha256, key, key_len);
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return 0;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
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hmac_sha384_init_usingrawkey(&hmac->sha384, key, key_len);
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return 0;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
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hmac_sha512_init_usingrawkey(&hmac->sha512, key, key_len);
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return 0;
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}
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pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n", __func__, hmac_id);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_init);
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void nvme_auth_hmac_update(struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx *hmac, const u8 *data,
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size_t data_len)
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{
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switch (hmac->hmac_id) {
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
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hmac_sha256_update(&hmac->sha256, data, data_len);
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return;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
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hmac_sha384_update(&hmac->sha384, data, data_len);
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return;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
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hmac_sha512_update(&hmac->sha512, data, data_len);
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return;
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}
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/* Unreachable because nvme_auth_hmac_init() validated hmac_id */
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WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_update);
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/* Finish computing an HMAC value. Note that this zeroizes the HMAC context. */
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void nvme_auth_hmac_final(struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx *hmac, u8 *out)
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{
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switch (hmac->hmac_id) {
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
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hmac_sha256_final(&hmac->sha256, out);
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return;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
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hmac_sha384_final(&hmac->sha384, out);
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return;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
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hmac_sha512_final(&hmac->sha512, out);
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return;
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}
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/* Unreachable because nvme_auth_hmac_init() validated hmac_id */
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WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_final);
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static int nvme_auth_hmac(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
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const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *out)
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{
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struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
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int ret;
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ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, hmac_id, key, key_len);
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if (ret == 0) {
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nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, data, data_len);
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nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, out);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static int nvme_auth_hash(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *out)
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{
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switch (hmac_id) {
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256:
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sha256(data, data_len, out);
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return 0;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA384:
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sha384(data, data_len, out);
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return 0;
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case NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512:
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sha512(data, data_len, out);
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return 0;
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}
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pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n", __func__, hmac_id);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_transform_key(
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const struct nvme_dhchap_key *key, const char *nqn)
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{
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struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
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int ret, key_len;
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if (!key) {
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pr_warn("No key specified\n");
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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}
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if (key->hash == 0) {
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key_len = nvme_auth_key_struct_size(key->len);
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transformed_key = kmemdup(key, key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!transformed_key)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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return transformed_key;
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}
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ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, key->hash, key->key, key->len);
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if (ret)
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return ERR_PTR(ret);
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key_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(key->hash);
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transformed_key = nvme_auth_alloc_key(key_len, key->hash);
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if (!transformed_key) {
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memzero_explicit(&hmac, sizeof(hmac));
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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}
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nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, nqn, strlen(nqn));
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nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17);
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nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, transformed_key->key);
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return transformed_key;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key);
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int nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
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const u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen)
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{
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u8 hashed_key[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
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int ret;
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ret = nvme_auth_hash(hmac_id, skey, skey_len, hashed_key);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ret = nvme_auth_hmac(hmac_id, hashed_key, hlen, challenge, hlen, aug);
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memzero_explicit(hashed_key, sizeof(hashed_key));
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_augmented_challenge);
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int nvme_auth_gen_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, u8 dh_gid)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(dh_tfm, NULL, 0);
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if (ret)
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pr_debug("failed to set private key, error %d\n", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_privkey);
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int nvme_auth_gen_pubkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
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u8 *host_key, size_t host_key_len)
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{
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struct kpp_request *req;
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struct crypto_wait wait;
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struct scatterlist dst;
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int ret;
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req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!req)
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return -ENOMEM;
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crypto_init_wait(&wait);
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kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
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sg_init_one(&dst, host_key, host_key_len);
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kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, host_key_len);
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kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
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crypto_req_done, &wait);
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ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait);
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kpp_request_free(req);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_pubkey);
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int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
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const u8 *ctrl_key, size_t ctrl_key_len,
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u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len)
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{
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struct kpp_request *req;
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struct crypto_wait wait;
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struct scatterlist src, dst;
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int ret;
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req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!req)
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return -ENOMEM;
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crypto_init_wait(&wait);
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sg_init_one(&src, ctrl_key, ctrl_key_len);
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kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, ctrl_key_len);
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sg_init_one(&dst, sess_key, sess_key_len);
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kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, sess_key_len);
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kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
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crypto_req_done, &wait);
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ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait);
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kpp_request_free(req);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret);
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int nvme_auth_parse_key(const char *secret, struct nvme_dhchap_key **ret_key)
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{
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struct nvme_dhchap_key *key;
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u8 key_hash;
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if (!secret) {
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*ret_key = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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if (sscanf(secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:", &key_hash) != 1)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */
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key = nvme_auth_extract_key(secret + 10, key_hash);
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if (IS_ERR(key)) {
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*ret_key = NULL;
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return PTR_ERR(key);
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}
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*ret_key = key;
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_parse_key);
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/**
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* nvme_auth_generate_psk - Generate a PSK for TLS
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* @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
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* @skey: Session key
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* @skey_len: Length of @skey
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* @c1: Value of challenge C1
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* @c2: Value of challenge C2
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* @hash_len: Hash length of the hash algorithm
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* @ret_psk: Pointer to the resulting generated PSK
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* @ret_len: length of @ret_psk
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*
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* Generate a PSK for TLS as specified in NVMe base specification, section
|
|
* 8.13.5.9: Generated PSK for TLS
|
|
*
|
|
* The generated PSK for TLS shall be computed applying the HMAC function
|
|
* using the hash function H( ) selected by the HashID parameter in the
|
|
* DH-HMAC-CHAP_Challenge message with the session key KS as key to the
|
|
* concatenation of the two challenges C1 and C2 (i.e., generated
|
|
* PSK = HMAC(KS, C1 || C2)).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success with a valid generated PSK pointer in @ret_psk and
|
|
* the length of @ret_psk in @ret_len, or a negative error number otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
|
|
const u8 *c1, const u8 *c2, size_t hash_len,
|
|
u8 **ret_psk, size_t *ret_len)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t psk_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id);
|
|
struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
|
|
u8 *psk;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!c1 || !c2)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, hmac_id, skey, skey_len);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
psk = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!psk) {
|
|
memzero_explicit(&hmac, sizeof(hmac));
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, c1, hash_len);
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, c2, hash_len);
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, psk);
|
|
*ret_psk = psk;
|
|
*ret_len = psk_len;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_psk);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* nvme_auth_generate_digest - Generate TLS PSK digest
|
|
* @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
|
|
* @psk: Generated input PSK
|
|
* @psk_len: Length of @psk
|
|
* @subsysnqn: NQN of the subsystem
|
|
* @hostnqn: NQN of the host
|
|
* @ret_digest: Pointer to the returned digest
|
|
*
|
|
* Generate a TLS PSK digest as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
|
|
* TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
|
|
*
|
|
* The PSK digest shall be computed by encoding in Base64 (refer to RFC
|
|
* 4648) the result of the application of the HMAC function using the hash
|
|
* function specified in item 4 above (ie the hash function of the cipher
|
|
* suite associated with the PSK identity) with the PSK as HMAC key to the
|
|
* concatenation of:
|
|
* - the NQN of the host (i.e., NQNh) not including the null terminator;
|
|
* - a space character;
|
|
* - the NQN of the NVM subsystem (i.e., NQNc) not including the null
|
|
* terminator;
|
|
* - a space character; and
|
|
* - the seventeen ASCII characters "NVMe-over-Fabrics"
|
|
* (i.e., <PSK digest> = Base64(HMAC(PSK, NQNh || " " || NQNc || " " ||
|
|
* "NVMe-over-Fabrics"))).
|
|
* The length of the PSK digest depends on the hash function used to compute
|
|
* it as follows:
|
|
* - If the SHA-256 hash function is used, the resulting PSK digest is 44
|
|
* characters long; or
|
|
* - If the SHA-384 hash function is used, the resulting PSK digest is 64
|
|
* characters long.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success with a valid digest pointer in @ret_digest, or a
|
|
* negative error number on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, const u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
|
|
const char *subsysnqn, const char *hostnqn,
|
|
char **ret_digest)
|
|
{
|
|
struct nvme_auth_hmac_ctx hmac;
|
|
u8 digest[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
|
size_t hash_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id);
|
|
char *enc;
|
|
size_t enc_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!subsysnqn || !hostnqn))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (hash_len == 0) {
|
|
pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
|
|
__func__, hmac_id);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (hash_len) {
|
|
case 32:
|
|
enc_len = 44;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 48:
|
|
enc_len = 64;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n",
|
|
__func__, nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id));
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enc = kzalloc(enc_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!enc) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = nvme_auth_hmac_init(&hmac, hmac_id, psk, psk_len);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, hostnqn, strlen(hostnqn));
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, " ", 1);
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, subsysnqn, strlen(subsysnqn));
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_update(&hmac, " NVMe-over-Fabrics", 18);
|
|
nvme_auth_hmac_final(&hmac, digest);
|
|
|
|
ret = base64_encode(digest, hash_len, enc, true, BASE64_STD);
|
|
if (ret < enc_len) {
|
|
ret = -ENOKEY;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
*ret_digest = enc;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
kfree_sensitive(enc);
|
|
memzero_explicit(digest, sizeof(digest));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_digest);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk - Derive TLS PSK
|
|
* @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
|
|
* @psk: generated input PSK
|
|
* @psk_len: size of @psk
|
|
* @psk_digest: TLS PSK digest
|
|
* @ret_psk: Pointer to the resulting TLS PSK
|
|
*
|
|
* Derive a TLS PSK as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
|
|
* TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
|
|
*
|
|
* The TLS PSK shall be derived as follows from an input PSK
|
|
* (i.e., either a retained PSK or a generated PSK) and a PSK
|
|
* identity using the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand-Label operations
|
|
* (refer to RFC 5869 and RFC 8446) where the hash function is the
|
|
* one specified by the hash specifier of the PSK identity:
|
|
* 1. PRK = HKDF-Extract(0, Input PSK); and
|
|
* 2. TLS PSK = HKDF-Expand-Label(PRK, "nvme-tls-psk", PskIdentityContext, L),
|
|
* where PskIdentityContext is the hash identifier indicated in
|
|
* the PSK identity concatenated to a space character and to the
|
|
* Base64 PSK digest (i.e., "<hash> <PSK digest>") and L is the
|
|
* output size in bytes of the hash function (i.e., 32 for SHA-256
|
|
* and 48 for SHA-384).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success with a valid psk pointer in @ret_psk or a negative
|
|
* error number otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
int nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(int hmac_id, const u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
|
|
const char *psk_digest, u8 **ret_psk)
|
|
{
|
|
static const u8 default_salt[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
|
static const char label[] = "tls13 nvme-tls-psk";
|
|
const size_t label_len = sizeof(label) - 1;
|
|
u8 prk[NVME_AUTH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
|
|
size_t hash_len, ctx_len;
|
|
u8 *hmac_data = NULL, *tls_key;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
hash_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id);
|
|
if (hash_len == 0) {
|
|
pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
|
|
__func__, hmac_id);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (hmac_id == NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512) {
|
|
pr_warn("%s: unsupported hash algorithm %s\n",
|
|
__func__, nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id));
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psk_len != hash_len) {
|
|
pr_warn("%s: unexpected psk_len %zu\n", __func__, psk_len);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* HKDF-Extract */
|
|
ret = nvme_auth_hmac(hmac_id, default_salt, hash_len, psk, psk_len,
|
|
prk);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* HKDF-Expand-Label (RFC 8446 section 7.1), with output length equal to
|
|
* the hash length (so only a single HMAC operation is needed)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
hmac_data = kmalloc(/* output length */ 2 +
|
|
/* label */ 1 + label_len +
|
|
/* context (max) */ 1 + 3 + 1 + strlen(psk_digest) +
|
|
/* counter */ 1,
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!hmac_data) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* output length */
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
hmac_data[i++] = hash_len >> 8;
|
|
hmac_data[i++] = hash_len;
|
|
|
|
/* label */
|
|
static_assert(label_len <= 255);
|
|
hmac_data[i] = label_len;
|
|
memcpy(&hmac_data[i + 1], label, label_len);
|
|
i += 1 + label_len;
|
|
|
|
/* context */
|
|
ctx_len = sprintf(&hmac_data[i + 1], "%02d %s", hmac_id, psk_digest);
|
|
if (ctx_len > 255) {
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
hmac_data[i] = ctx_len;
|
|
i += 1 + ctx_len;
|
|
|
|
/* counter (this overwrites the NUL terminator written by sprintf) */
|
|
hmac_data[i++] = 1;
|
|
|
|
tls_key = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!tls_key) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = nvme_auth_hmac(hmac_id, prk, hash_len, hmac_data, i, tls_key);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
kfree_sensitive(tls_key);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
*ret_psk = tls_key;
|
|
out:
|
|
kfree_sensitive(hmac_data);
|
|
memzero_explicit(prk, sizeof(prk));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
|