Files
linux/security/landlock/audit.c
Günther Noack ae97330d1b landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path
* Add a new access right LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, which
  controls the lookup operations for named UNIX domain sockets.  The
  resolution happens during connect() and sendmsg() (depending on
  socket type).
* Change access_mask_t from u16 to u32 (see below)
* Hook into the path lookup in unix_find_bsd() in af_unix.c, using a
  LSM hook.  Make policy decisions based on the new access rights
* Increment the Landlock ABI version.
* Minor test adaptations to keep the tests working.
* Document the design rationale for scoped access rights,
  and cross-reference it from the header documentation.

With this access right, access is granted if either of the following
conditions is met:

* The target socket's filesystem path was allow-listed using a
  LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH rule, *or*:
* The target socket was created in the same Landlock domain in which
  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX was restricted.

In case of a denial, connect() and sendmsg() return EACCES, which is
the same error as it is returned if the user does not have the write
bit in the traditional UNIX file system permissions of that file.

The access_mask_t type grows from u16 to u32 to make space for the new
access right.  This also doubles the size of struct layer_access_masks
from 32 byte to 64 byte.  To avoid memory layout inconsistencies between
architectures (especially m68k), pack and align struct access_masks [2].

Document the (possible future) interaction between scoped flags and
other access rights in struct landlock_ruleset_attr, and summarize the
rationale, as discussed in code review leading up to [3].

This feature was created with substantial discussion and input from
Justin Suess, Tingmao Wang and Mickaël Salaün.

Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link[1]: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/36
Link[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260401.Re1Eesu1Yaij@digikod.net/
Link[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260205.8531e4005118@gnoack.org/
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260327164838.38231-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com
[mic: Fix kernel-doc formatting, pack and align access_masks]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-04-07 18:51:06 +02:00

493 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Landlock - Audit helpers
*
* Copyright © 2023-2025 Microsoft Corporation
*/
#include <kunit/test.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
#include "access.h"
#include "audit.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
#include "domain.h"
#include "limits.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = {
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = "fs.execute",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = "fs.write_file",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)] = "fs.read_file",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)] = "fs.read_dir",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR)] = "fs.remove_dir",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE)] = "fs.remove_file",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR)] = "fs.make_char",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR)] = "fs.make_dir",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG)] = "fs.make_reg",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK)] = "fs.make_sock",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO)] = "fs.make_fifo",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK)] = "fs.make_block",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM)] = "fs.make_sym",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)] = "fs.refer",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)] = "fs.truncate",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)] = "fs.ioctl_dev",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)] = "fs.resolve_unix",
};
static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
static const char *const net_access_strings[] = {
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net.bind_tcp",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net.connect_tcp",
};
static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
static __attribute_const__ const char *
get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
const unsigned long access_bit)
{
switch (type) {
case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE:
WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
return "ptrace";
case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY:
WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
return "fs.change_topology";
case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings)))
return "unknown";
return fs_access_strings[access_bit];
case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings)))
return "unknown";
return net_access_strings[access_bit];
case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET:
WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
return "scope.abstract_unix_socket";
case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
return "scope.signal";
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return "unknown";
}
static void log_blockers(struct audit_buffer *const ab,
const enum landlock_request_type type,
const access_mask_t access)
{
const unsigned long access_mask = access;
unsigned long access_bit;
bool is_first = true;
for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_mask, BITS_PER_TYPE(access)) {
audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", is_first ? "" : ",",
get_blocker(type, access_bit));
is_first = false;
}
if (is_first)
audit_log_format(ab, "%s", get_blocker(type, -1));
}
static void log_domain(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
/* Ignores already logged domains. */
if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) == LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED)
return;
/* Uses consistent allocation flags wrt common_lsm_audit(). */
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN,
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN);
if (!ab)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(hierarchy->id == 0);
audit_log_format(
ab,
"domain=%llx status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=%d uid=%u exe=",
hierarchy->id, pid_nr(hierarchy->details->pid),
hierarchy->details->uid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hierarchy->details->exe_path);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hierarchy->details->comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
/*
* There may be race condition leading to logging of the same domain
* several times but that is OK.
*/
WRITE_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status, LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED);
}
static struct landlock_hierarchy *
get_hierarchy(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const size_t layer)
{
struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy = domain->hierarchy;
ssize_t i;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(layer >= domain->num_layers))
return hierarchy;
for (i = domain->num_layers - 1; i > layer; i--) {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy->parent))
break;
hierarchy = hierarchy->parent;
}
return hierarchy;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
static void test_get_hierarchy(struct kunit *const test)
{
struct landlock_hierarchy dom0_hierarchy = {
.id = 10,
};
struct landlock_hierarchy dom1_hierarchy = {
.parent = &dom0_hierarchy,
.id = 20,
};
struct landlock_hierarchy dom2_hierarchy = {
.parent = &dom1_hierarchy,
.id = 30,
};
struct landlock_ruleset dom2 = {
.hierarchy = &dom2_hierarchy,
.num_layers = 3,
};
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 10, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 0)->id);
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 20, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 1)->id);
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 30, get_hierarchy(&dom2, 2)->id);
/* KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 30, get_hierarchy(&dom2, -1)->id); */
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
/* Get the youngest layer that denied the access_request. */
static size_t get_denied_layer(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
access_mask_t *const access_request,
const struct layer_access_masks *masks)
{
for (ssize_t i = ARRAY_SIZE(masks->access) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (masks->access[i] & *access_request) {
*access_request &= masks->access[i];
return i;
}
}
/* Not found - fall back to default values */
*access_request = 0;
return domain->num_layers - 1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
static void test_get_denied_layer(struct kunit *const test)
{
const struct landlock_ruleset dom = {
.num_layers = 5,
};
const struct layer_access_masks masks = {
.access[0] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
.access[1] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
.access[2] = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR,
};
access_mask_t access;
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 1, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 4, get_denied_layer(&dom, &access, &masks));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, 0);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
static size_t
get_layer_from_deny_masks(access_mask_t *const access_request,
const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
const deny_masks_t deny_masks)
{
const unsigned long access_opt = all_existing_optional_access;
const unsigned long access_req = *access_request;
access_mask_t missing = 0;
size_t youngest_layer = 0;
size_t access_index = 0;
unsigned long access_bit;
/* This will require change with new object types. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(access_opt != _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL);
for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_opt,
BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t)) {
if (access_req & BIT(access_bit)) {
const size_t layer =
(deny_masks >> (access_index * 4)) &
(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1);
if (layer > youngest_layer) {
youngest_layer = layer;
missing = BIT(access_bit);
} else if (layer == youngest_layer) {
missing |= BIT(access_bit);
}
}
access_index++;
}
*access_request = missing;
return youngest_layer;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
static void test_get_layer_from_deny_masks(struct kunit *const test)
{
deny_masks_t deny_mask;
access_mask_t access;
/* truncate:0 ioctl_dev:2 */
deny_mask = 0x20;
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access,
_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
deny_mask));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access,
_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
deny_mask));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
/* truncate:15 ioctl_dev:15 */
deny_mask = 0xff;
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access,
_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
deny_mask));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
get_layer_from_deny_masks(&access,
_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
deny_mask));
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
static bool is_valid_request(const struct landlock_request *const request)
{
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_plus_one > LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS))
return false;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_plus_one ^ !!request->access)))
return false;
if (request->access) {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_masks ^
!!request->all_existing_optional_access)))
return false;
} else {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_masks ||
request->all_existing_optional_access))
return false;
}
if (request->deny_masks) {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!request->all_existing_optional_access))
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* landlock_log_denial - Create audit records related to a denial
*
* @subject: The Landlock subject's credential denying an action.
* @request: Detail of the user space request.
*/
void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
const struct landlock_request *const request)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct landlock_hierarchy *youngest_denied;
size_t youngest_layer;
access_mask_t missing;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!subject || !subject->domain ||
!subject->domain->hierarchy || !request))
return;
if (!is_valid_request(request))
return;
missing = request->access;
if (missing) {
/* Gets the nearest domain that denies the request. */
if (request->layer_masks) {
youngest_layer = get_denied_layer(subject->domain,
&missing,
request->layer_masks);
} else {
youngest_layer = get_layer_from_deny_masks(
&missing, _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
request->deny_masks);
}
youngest_denied =
get_hierarchy(subject->domain, youngest_layer);
} else {
youngest_layer = request->layer_plus_one - 1;
youngest_denied =
get_hierarchy(subject->domain, youngest_layer);
}
if (READ_ONCE(youngest_denied->log_status) == LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED)
return;
/*
* Consistently keeps track of the number of denied access requests
* even if audit is currently disabled, or if audit rules currently
* exclude this record type, or if landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags
* quiet logs.
*/
atomic64_inc(&youngest_denied->num_denials);
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
/* Checks if the current exec was restricting itself. */
if (subject->domain_exec & BIT(youngest_layer)) {
/* Ignores denials for the same execution. */
if (!youngest_denied->log_same_exec)
return;
} else {
/* Ignores denials after a new execution. */
if (!youngest_denied->log_new_exec)
return;
}
/* Uses consistent allocation flags wrt common_lsm_audit(). */
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN,
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "domain=%llx blockers=", youngest_denied->id);
log_blockers(ab, request->type, missing);
audit_log_lsm_data(ab, &request->audit);
audit_log_end(ab);
/* Logs this domain the first time it shows in log. */
log_domain(youngest_denied);
}
/**
* landlock_log_drop_domain - Create an audit record on domain deallocation
*
* @hierarchy: The domain's hierarchy being deallocated.
*
* Only domains which previously appeared in the audit logs are logged again.
* This is useful to know when a domain will never show again in the audit log.
*
* Called in a work queue scheduled by landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() called
* by hook_cred_free().
*/
void landlock_log_drop_domain(const struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy))
return;
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
/* Ignores domains that were not logged. */
if (READ_ONCE(hierarchy->log_status) != LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED)
return;
/*
* If logging of domain allocation succeeded, warns about failure to log
* domain deallocation to highlight unbalanced domain lifetime logs.
*/
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN);
if (!ab)
return;
audit_log_format(ab, "domain=%llx status=deallocated denials=%llu",
hierarchy->id, atomic64_read(&hierarchy->num_denials));
audit_log_end(ab);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
/* clang-format off */
KUNIT_CASE(test_get_hierarchy),
KUNIT_CASE(test_get_denied_layer),
KUNIT_CASE(test_get_layer_from_deny_masks),
{}
/* clang-format on */
};
static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
.name = "landlock_audit",
.test_cases = test_cases,
};
kunit_test_suite(test_suite);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */