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In ovpn_net_xmit, after GSO segmentation and segment processing, the
first segment on the list is used to increment VPN TX statistics, which
fails to account for any subsequent segments in the chain.
Fix this by accumulating the length of every segment that successfully
passes skb_share_check into a tx_bytes variable. This ensures the peer
statistics accurately reflect the total data volume sent, regardless of
whether the original packet was segmented.
Fixes: 04ca14955f ("ovpn: store tunnel and transport statistics")
Signed-off-by: Ralf Lici <ralf@mandelbit.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
479 lines
12 KiB
C
479 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/* OpenVPN data channel offload
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2019-2025 OpenVPN, Inc.
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*
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* Author: James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
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* Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
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*/
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#include <crypto/aead.h>
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#include <linux/netdevice.h>
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#include <linux/skbuff.h>
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#include <net/gro_cells.h>
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#include <net/gso.h>
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#include <net/ip.h>
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#include "ovpnpriv.h"
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#include "peer.h"
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#include "io.h"
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#include "bind.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "crypto_aead.h"
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#include "netlink.h"
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#include "proto.h"
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#include "tcp.h"
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#include "udp.h"
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#include "skb.h"
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#include "socket.h"
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const unsigned char ovpn_keepalive_message[OVPN_KEEPALIVE_SIZE] = {
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0x2a, 0x18, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0x64, 0x1e, 0xb4, 0xcb,
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0x07, 0xed, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0x98, 0x1f, 0xc7, 0x48
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};
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/**
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* ovpn_is_keepalive - check if skb contains a keepalive message
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* @skb: packet to check
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*
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* Assumes that the first byte of skb->data is defined.
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*
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* Return: true if skb contains a keepalive or false otherwise
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*/
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static bool ovpn_is_keepalive(struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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if (*skb->data != ovpn_keepalive_message[0])
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return false;
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if (skb->len != OVPN_KEEPALIVE_SIZE)
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return false;
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if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, OVPN_KEEPALIVE_SIZE))
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return false;
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return !memcmp(skb->data, ovpn_keepalive_message, OVPN_KEEPALIVE_SIZE);
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}
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/* Called after decrypt to write the IP packet to the device.
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* This method is expected to manage/free the skb.
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*/
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static void ovpn_netdev_write(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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unsigned int pkt_len;
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int ret;
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/*
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* GSO state from the transport layer is not valid for the tunnel/data
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* path. Reset all GSO fields to prevent any further GSO processing
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* from entering an inconsistent state.
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*/
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skb_gso_reset(skb);
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/* we can't guarantee the packet wasn't corrupted before entering the
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* VPN, therefore we give other layers a chance to check that
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*/
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skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
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/* skb hash for transport packet no longer valid after decapsulation */
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skb_clear_hash(skb);
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/* post-decrypt scrub -- prepare to inject encapsulated packet onto the
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* interface, based on __skb_tunnel_rx() in dst.h
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*/
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skb->dev = peer->ovpn->dev;
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skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, 0);
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skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
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/* network header reset in ovpn_decrypt_post() */
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skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
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skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
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/* cause packet to be "received" by the interface */
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pkt_len = skb->len;
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ret = gro_cells_receive(&peer->ovpn->gro_cells, skb);
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if (likely(ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS)) {
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/* update RX stats with the size of decrypted packet */
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ovpn_peer_stats_increment_rx(&peer->vpn_stats, pkt_len);
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dev_dstats_rx_add(peer->ovpn->dev, pkt_len);
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}
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}
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void ovpn_decrypt_post(void *data, int ret)
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{
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struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks;
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unsigned int payload_offset = 0;
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struct sk_buff *skb = data;
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struct ovpn_socket *sock;
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struct ovpn_peer *peer;
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__be16 proto;
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__be32 *pid;
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/* crypto is happening asynchronously. this function will be called
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* again later by the crypto callback with a proper return code
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*/
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if (unlikely(ret == -EINPROGRESS))
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return;
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payload_offset = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->payload_offset;
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ks = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->ks;
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peer = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->peer;
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/* crypto is done, cleanup skb CB and its members */
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kfree(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv);
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kfree(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg);
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aead_request_free(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->req);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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goto drop;
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/* PID sits after the op */
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pid = (__force __be32 *)(skb->data + OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE);
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ret = ovpn_pktid_recv(&ks->pid_recv, ntohl(*pid), 0);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
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net_err_ratelimited("%s: PKT ID RX error for peer %u: %d\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev), peer->id,
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ret);
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goto drop;
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}
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/* keep track of last received authenticated packet for keepalive */
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WRITE_ONCE(peer->last_recv, ktime_get_real_seconds());
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rcu_read_lock();
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sock = rcu_dereference(peer->sock);
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if (sock && sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP)
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/* check if this peer changed local or remote endpoint */
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ovpn_peer_endpoints_update(peer, skb);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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/* point to encapsulated IP packet */
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__skb_pull(skb, payload_offset);
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/* check if this is a valid datapacket that has to be delivered to the
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* ovpn interface
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*/
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skb_reset_network_header(skb);
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proto = ovpn_ip_check_protocol(skb);
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if (unlikely(!proto)) {
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/* check if null packet */
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if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, 1))) {
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net_info_ratelimited("%s: NULL packet received from peer %u\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev),
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peer->id);
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goto drop;
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}
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if (ovpn_is_keepalive(skb)) {
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: ping received from peer %u\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev),
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peer->id);
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/* we drop the packet, but this is not a failure */
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consume_skb(skb);
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goto drop_nocount;
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}
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net_info_ratelimited("%s: unsupported protocol received from peer %u\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev), peer->id);
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goto drop;
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}
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skb->protocol = proto;
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/* perform Reverse Path Filtering (RPF) */
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if (unlikely(!ovpn_peer_check_by_src(peer->ovpn, skb, peer))) {
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if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: RPF dropped packet from peer %u, src: %pI6c\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev),
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peer->id, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
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else
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: RPF dropped packet from peer %u, src: %pI4\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev),
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peer->id, &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
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goto drop;
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}
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ovpn_netdev_write(peer, skb);
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/* skb is passed to upper layer - don't free it */
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skb = NULL;
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drop:
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if (unlikely(skb))
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dev_dstats_rx_dropped(peer->ovpn->dev);
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kfree_skb(skb);
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drop_nocount:
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if (likely(peer))
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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if (likely(ks))
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ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
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}
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/* RX path entry point: decrypt packet and forward it to the device */
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void ovpn_recv(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks;
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u8 key_id;
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ovpn_peer_stats_increment_rx(&peer->link_stats, skb->len);
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/* get the key slot matching the key ID in the received packet */
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key_id = ovpn_key_id_from_skb(skb);
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ks = ovpn_crypto_key_id_to_slot(&peer->crypto, key_id);
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if (unlikely(!ks)) {
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net_info_ratelimited("%s: no available key for peer %u, key-id: %u\n",
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netdev_name(peer->ovpn->dev), peer->id,
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key_id);
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dev_dstats_rx_dropped(peer->ovpn->dev);
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kfree_skb(skb);
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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return;
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}
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memset(ovpn_skb_cb(skb), 0, sizeof(struct ovpn_cb));
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ovpn_decrypt_post(skb, ovpn_aead_decrypt(peer, ks, skb));
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}
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void ovpn_encrypt_post(void *data, int ret)
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{
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struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks;
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struct sk_buff *skb = data;
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struct ovpn_socket *sock;
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struct ovpn_peer *peer;
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unsigned int orig_len;
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/* encryption is happening asynchronously. This function will be
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* called later by the crypto callback with a proper return value
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*/
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if (unlikely(ret == -EINPROGRESS))
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return;
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ks = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->ks;
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peer = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->peer;
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/* crypto is done, cleanup skb CB and its members */
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kfree(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv);
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kfree(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg);
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aead_request_free(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->req);
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if (unlikely(ret == -ERANGE)) {
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/* we ran out of IVs and we must kill the key as it can't be
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* use anymore
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*/
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netdev_warn(peer->ovpn->dev,
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"killing key %u for peer %u\n", ks->key_id,
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peer->id);
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if (ovpn_crypto_kill_key(&peer->crypto, ks->key_id))
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/* let userspace know so that a new key must be negotiated */
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ovpn_nl_key_swap_notify(peer, ks->key_id);
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goto err;
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}
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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goto err;
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skb_mark_not_on_list(skb);
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orig_len = skb->len;
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rcu_read_lock();
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sock = rcu_dereference(peer->sock);
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if (unlikely(!sock))
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goto err_unlock;
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switch (sock->sk->sk_protocol) {
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case IPPROTO_UDP:
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ovpn_udp_send_skb(peer, sock->sk, skb);
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break;
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case IPPROTO_TCP:
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ovpn_tcp_send_skb(peer, sock->sk, skb);
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break;
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default:
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/* no transport configured yet */
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goto err_unlock;
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}
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ovpn_peer_stats_increment_tx(&peer->link_stats, orig_len);
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/* keep track of last sent packet for keepalive */
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WRITE_ONCE(peer->last_sent, ktime_get_real_seconds());
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/* skb passed down the stack - don't free it */
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skb = NULL;
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err_unlock:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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err:
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if (unlikely(skb))
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dev_dstats_tx_dropped(peer->ovpn->dev);
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if (likely(peer))
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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if (likely(ks))
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ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
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kfree_skb(skb);
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}
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static bool ovpn_encrypt_one(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks;
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/* get primary key to be used for encrypting data */
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ks = ovpn_crypto_key_slot_primary(&peer->crypto);
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if (unlikely(!ks))
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return false;
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/* take a reference to the peer because the crypto code may run async.
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* ovpn_encrypt_post() will release it upon completion
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*/
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if (unlikely(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) {
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DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
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ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks);
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return false;
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}
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memset(ovpn_skb_cb(skb), 0, sizeof(struct ovpn_cb));
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ovpn_encrypt_post(skb, ovpn_aead_encrypt(peer, ks, skb));
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return true;
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}
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/* send skb to connected peer, if any */
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static void ovpn_send(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, struct sk_buff *skb,
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struct ovpn_peer *peer)
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{
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struct sk_buff *curr, *next;
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/* this might be a GSO-segmented skb list: process each skb
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* independently
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*/
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skb_list_walk_safe(skb, curr, next) {
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if (unlikely(!ovpn_encrypt_one(peer, curr))) {
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dev_dstats_tx_dropped(ovpn->dev);
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kfree_skb(curr);
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}
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}
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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}
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/* Send user data to the network
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*/
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netdev_tx_t ovpn_net_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
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{
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struct ovpn_priv *ovpn = netdev_priv(dev);
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struct sk_buff *segments, *curr, *next;
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struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
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unsigned int tx_bytes = 0;
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struct ovpn_peer *peer;
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__be16 proto;
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int ret;
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/* reset netfilter state */
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nf_reset_ct(skb);
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/* verify IP header size in network packet */
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proto = ovpn_ip_check_protocol(skb);
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if (unlikely(!proto || skb->protocol != proto))
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goto drop_no_peer;
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/* retrieve peer serving the destination IP of this packet */
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peer = ovpn_peer_get_by_dst(ovpn, skb);
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if (unlikely(!peer)) {
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switch (skb->protocol) {
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case htons(ETH_P_IP):
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: no peer to send data to dst=%pI4\n",
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netdev_name(ovpn->dev),
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&ip_hdr(skb)->daddr);
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break;
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case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
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net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: no peer to send data to dst=%pI6c\n",
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netdev_name(ovpn->dev),
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&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
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break;
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}
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goto drop_no_peer;
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}
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/* dst was needed for peer selection - it can now be dropped */
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skb_dst_drop(skb);
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if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
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segments = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(segments)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(segments);
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net_err_ratelimited("%s: cannot segment payload packet: %d\n",
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netdev_name(dev), ret);
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goto drop;
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}
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consume_skb(skb);
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skb = segments;
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}
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/* from this moment on, "skb" might be a list */
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__skb_queue_head_init(&skb_list);
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skb_list_walk_safe(skb, curr, next) {
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skb_mark_not_on_list(curr);
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curr = skb_share_check(curr, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (unlikely(!curr)) {
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net_err_ratelimited("%s: skb_share_check failed for payload packet\n",
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netdev_name(dev));
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dev_dstats_tx_dropped(ovpn->dev);
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continue;
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}
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/* only count what we actually send */
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tx_bytes += curr->len;
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__skb_queue_tail(&skb_list, curr);
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}
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/* no segments survived: don't jump to 'drop' because we already
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* incremented the counter for each failure in the loop
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*/
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if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&skb_list))) {
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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return NETDEV_TX_OK;
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}
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skb_list.prev->next = NULL;
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ovpn_peer_stats_increment_tx(&peer->vpn_stats, tx_bytes);
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ovpn_send(ovpn, skb_list.next, peer);
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return NETDEV_TX_OK;
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drop:
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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drop_no_peer:
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dev_dstats_tx_dropped(ovpn->dev);
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skb_tx_error(skb);
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kfree_skb_list(skb);
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return NETDEV_TX_OK;
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}
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/**
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* ovpn_xmit_special - encrypt and transmit an out-of-band message to peer
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* @peer: peer to send the message to
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* @data: message content
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* @len: message length
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*
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* Assumes that caller holds a reference to peer, which will be
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* passed to ovpn_send()
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*/
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void ovpn_xmit_special(struct ovpn_peer *peer, const void *data,
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const unsigned int len)
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{
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struct ovpn_priv *ovpn;
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struct sk_buff *skb;
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ovpn = peer->ovpn;
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if (unlikely(!ovpn)) {
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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return;
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}
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skb = alloc_skb(256 + len, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (unlikely(!skb)) {
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ovpn_peer_put(peer);
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return;
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}
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skb_reserve(skb, 128);
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skb->priority = TC_PRIO_BESTEFFORT;
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__skb_put_data(skb, data, len);
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ovpn_send(ovpn, skb, peer);
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}
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