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io_uring/cancel: validate opcode for IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_OP
io_async_cancel_prep() reads the opcode selector from sqe->len and stores it in cancel->opcode, which is an 8-bit field. Since sqe->len is a 32-bit value, values larger than U8_MAX are implicitly truncated. This can cause unintended opcode matches when the truncated value corresponds to a valid io_uring opcode. For example, submitting a value such as 0x10b will be truncated to 0x0b (IORING_OP_TIMEOUT), allowing a cancel request to match operations it did not intend to target. Validate the opcode value before assigning it to the 8-bit field and reject values outside the valid io_uring opcode range. Signed-off-by: Amir Mohammad Jahangirzad <a.jahangirzad@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260331232113.615972-1-a.jahangirzad@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Jens Axboe
parent
19a8cc6cda
commit
85a58309c0
@@ -156,9 +156,16 @@ int io_async_cancel_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe)
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cancel->fd = READ_ONCE(sqe->fd);
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}
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if (cancel->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_OP) {
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u32 op;
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if (cancel->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ANY)
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return -EINVAL;
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cancel->opcode = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
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op = READ_ONCE(sqe->len);
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if (op >= IORING_OP_LAST)
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return -EINVAL;
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cancel->opcode = op;
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}
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return 0;
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